

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 4346

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: MISSION COMMENTS ON LATEST IS DRAFT OF
SECTION II (ALLIED POSITION)

REF: A) USNATO 4154 (NOTAL); B) STATE 179893 (NOTAL)
C) STATE 179889 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: AT SEPTEMBER 12-13 MEETINGS, SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE
COMPLETED PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH REVIEW OF THIRD REVISION OF
SECTION II (REF A). COMMITTEE ACCEPTED SEVERAL US SUGGESTIONS
CONTAINED REF B AND DROPPED A NUMBER OF BRACKETS. DUE TO SLIGHT
SOFTENING OF TURKISH POSITION, PROGRESS MADE TOWARDS AGREED LANGUAGE
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ON UNDIMINISHED SECURITY ANC CONCERNS OF THE FLANKS. FRG HELD
FIRM TO ITS FORMULATIONS ON ALL POINTS, HOWEVER, AND JOINED
NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM IN INSISTING THAT SECOND PHASE MUST "FOCUS"
ON NON-US NATO FORCE REDUCTIONS. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE ON

FOURTH REVISION OF IS DRAFT OF SECTION II (TEXT SENT SEPTTEL).
END SUMMARY

1. THE FOLLOWING REPORT OF THE SEPTEMBER 12-13 SPC DISCUSSIONS AND MISSIONS COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO THE THIRD IS DRAFT OF SECTION II (REF A):

PARA 3. COMMITTEE AGREED TO DELETE SECOND SENTENCE, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS POINT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN THE ALLIANCE.

PARA 4. FOOTNOTE 2. US AMENDMENT ACCEPTED, WITH FURTHER UK REFINEMENT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT FOOTNOTE APPLIES ONLY TO "THE INTERNAL NATO CALCULATIONS" AND TO REMOVE ANY POSSIBLE IMPLICATION THAT ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA WOULD ADDRESS QUESTION OF FRENCH FORCES.

PARA 5. US REP REITERATED VIEW THAT WHILE US AGREED FULLY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, SUBJECT WAS ALREADY COVERED ADEQUATELY IN SECRET GUIDELINES. ITALIAN, TURKISH, GREEK AND NORWEGIAN

REPS DISAGREED VIGOROUSLY AND SAID THAT INCLUSION OF PARAGRAPH ON THIS PRINCIPLE IN SECTION II WAS ESSENTIAL. NORWEGIAN REP LEFT OPENING, HOWEVER, BY STATING THAT TERMS "AGREED" AND NEGOTIATED" IN FINAL SENTENCE WERE NOT AS IMPORTANT FOR HIM AS TERM "MEASURES." IN ENSUING EXCHANGE, TURKISH REP (TULUMEN) PRESSED FOR PRINCIPLE OF AGREEMENT ON A SET OF SPECIAL MEASURES FOR THE FLANKS, AND US REP DREW ON USEFUL ARGUMENTATION CONTAINED REF C AGAINST EXPANDING GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF MBFR MEASURES. RESULT OF DISCUSSION WAS AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT TO REPLACE PRESENT FINAL SENTENCE WITH FOLLOWING:

"ALLIED PROPOSALS SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS OBJECTIVE AND SHOULD GIVE FULL WEIGHT IN EACH PROVISION ON THE SPECIAL CONCERNS OF THE NATO FLANK COUNTRIES." ON BASIS THIS AD REF AGREEMENT, BRACKETS DROPPED AROUND PARA 5 AND FOOTNOTE DELETED. (COMMENT: MISSION RECOMMENDS ACCEPTANCE OF THIS FORMULATION WHICH OMITTS REFERENCE TO ALLIED AGREEMENT TO SPECIFIC MEASURES FOR THE FLANKS. END COMMENT)

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PARA 6. IN LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF BRACKETED THIRD SENTENCE IN FIRST PARAGRAPH, ITALIAN REP (SPINELLI) ARGUED FOR ITS RETENTION ON GROUNDS THAT EMPHASIS ON FORCES RATHER THAN TERRITORIES WOULD HELP AVOID SITUATION IN WHICH ITALY WOULD ITSELF HAVE TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY. WILLOT AGREED, BUT ADDED THAT ANY AGREEMENT, WHETHER SIGNED BY THE COUNTRY WITH FORCES OR THE RECEIVING COUNTRY, WOULD NEED TO SPECIFY CERTAIN TERRITORIES. RESULT IS COMBINED ITALIAN/BELGIAN THIRD SENTENCE IN BRACKETS. US, DUTCH AND CANADIAN REPS DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS FEASIBLE TO SEPARATE FORCES AND TERRITORIES AND NOTED THAT MEASURES THEMSELVES INCLUDED BOTH ELEMENTS. FOOTNOTE 1 ADDED TO REFLECT DUTCH VIEW THAT THESE MEASURES COULD ACCOMPANY AS WELL AS PRECEDE REDUCTIONS.

PARA 6, (II)-(IV). US REP REPEATED HOPE THAT ALLIES WOULD AGREE TO THESE MEASURES AND DROP BRACKETS. UK REP (LEVER) RESPONDED THAT, WHILE LONDON STILL HAD THESE MEASURES UNDER STUDY, UK VIEWED SUB-PARAS (II) AND (IV) AS ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL TO CBM'S IN CSCE CONTEXT. "MAJOR" MIGHT BE DEFINED MORE PRECISELY IN MBFR CONTEXT AND MIGHT INCLUDE SOME VERIFICATION MEASURES, BUT THESE DIFFERENCES WERE THIN. UK DOUBTED FEASIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING ESSENTIALLY THE SAME MEASURES IN TWO DIFFERENT PLACES AND PREFERRED TO SEE WHAT WILL COME OUT OF CSCE. RE SUBPARA (III), LEVER DOUBTED THAT THE MARGINAL VALUE OF INCLUDING NSWP FORCES IN THESE LIMITATIONS COULD COMPENSATE FOR THE DISTINCT DISADVANTAGE TO THE WEST OF APPLYING THEM TO NON-US NATO FORCES.

US REP, SUPPORTED BY BELGIAN AND DUTCH REPS, RECALLED THAT CBM'S WOULD BE PERMISSIVE, VOLUNTARY AND UNRELATED TO A SPECIFIC AREA, AND THAT PARTICIPATION BY OTHER NATO FORCES WOULD GIVE MULTI-LATERAL CHARACTER TO INITIAL PHASE. US REP POINTED OUT THAT PARTICIPATION OF NSWP FORCES IN CZECHOSLAVIA INTERVENTION ILLUSTRATED THAT INCLUSION OF THESE FORCES WAS OF MORE THAN MARGINAL VALUE. FRG REP (BOSS) SAID BONN COULD NOT ACCEPT SUBPARA (III), SINCE IT COULD IMPOSE TOO SEVERE RESTRICTIONS ON NATO FORCES

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PARA 8. UK REP ACCEPTED SENTENCE PROPOSED REF B AND AGREED TO DROP

BRACKETED PHRASE. HE BRACKETED "MANPOWER" FOR SAME REASONS AS IN
PARA 7.

PARA 10. TURKEY RETAINED BRACKETS.

PARA 11 (I). UK ACCEPTED US ARGUMENTATION AND AGREED TO DROP
"WITHDRAWAL."

PARA 11 (II). US AMENDMENT CONTAINED REF B ACCEPTED.

PARA 11 (III). TURKISH AND UK REPS ARGUED THAT ALLIES COULD AT LEAST
TRY THIS PROPOSAL ON SOVIETS, IF ONLY TO DETERMINE SOVIET REACTION.
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THE ARGUMENT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE UNACCEPTABLE COUNTERPROPOSALS
WAS NOT RPT NOT VALID IN THEIR OPINION, SINCE THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY
TO MAKE SUCH COUNTERPROPOSALS IN ANY CASE, AS THEY DID IN VIENNA,
AND THE WEST IS UNDER NO COMPUNCTION TO ACCEPT THEM. LEVER
BELIEVED THAT ALLIES WOULD NEED TO HAVE PROPOSALS OF THIS KIND
IN ORDER TO ILLUSTRATE AS GRAPHICALLY AS POSSIBLE THE ASYMMETRIES
IN THE CURRENT SECURITY BALANCE. IN PARTICULAR, THE ALLIES HAD
TO REINFORCE THE POINT THAT SOVIET TERRITORIES ABUTTED ON THE NGA.

US REP, WITH SUPPORT FROM CANADA AND BELGIUM, RESPONDED THAT
ALLIES SHOULD NOT RPT NOT TRY OUT SUCH PROPOSALS ON SOVIETS. DRAWING
AGAIN ON REF C, US REP WARNED AGAINST EXPANDING THE SCOPE AND
SUBSTANCE OF MBFR AND POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES IN HANDLING SOVIET
COUNTERPROPOSALS.

A SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL TO DISBAND US FORCES, FOR EXAMPLE,
MIGHT APPEAL TO ELEMENTS IN CONGRESS WHO ARE IN VAVOR OF UNILATERAL
US CUTS -- AND NOT NECESSARILY JUST IN CENTRAL EUROPE. US REP
POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSALS COULD LEAD TO PRECISELY
THE KIND OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN THE CHARACTER OF US FORCE
REDUCTIONS WHICH THE UK AND OTHERS HAD SO OFTEN SAID THEY WISHED
TO AVOID. THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE US WOULD NOT WORK VIGOROUSLY
IN VIENNA TO GET SOVIETS TO ACCEPT REALITY OF ASYMMETRY. PARA 10
OF THE US PROPOSAL FOR SECTION III SUGGESTS IN FACT THAT
THE ALLIES DO SO.

PARA 12. FOOTNOTE IS CROSS REFERENCE TO PARA 6.

PARA 12 (II). US REP DREW UPON ARGUMENTS IN REF B IN SUPPORT OF THIS
MEASURE. WILLOT RESPONDED THAT THIS MEASURE COULD UNFAVORABLY AFFECT
EUROPEAN FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE, AND AS FRG HAD FREQUENTLY
POINTED OUT, COULD TEND TO CREATE A SPECIAL ZONE AND INVOLVE MBFR IN
THE QUESTION OF DEFINING NATIONAL BOUNDARIES. HE SUGGESTED DELETING
THIS MEASURE AND REPLACING IT WITH A NEW MEASURE, WHICH WOULD COINCIDE

WITH SHAPE VIEWS, FOR NOTIFICATION, WITHOUT TIME LAG, OF MAJOR MOVE-
MENTS OF FORCES WITHIN THE AREA. (COMMENT: THIS IS SAME PROPOSAL
AS MISSION'S EARLIER SUGGESTION TO WASHINGTON IN USNATO 4184.

END COMMENT) US REP SAID THAT WILLOT'S PROPOSAL WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE ENOUGH IN INHIBITING SOVIET INTERVENTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE. WILLOT REPLIED THAT IF THE SOVIETS CHOSE TO USE FORCE IN EASTERN SECRET

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EUROPE THE ENTIRE MBFR AGREEMENT MIGHT COME INTO QUESTION. FURTHER, WILLOT RECALLED, SOVIET FORCES THAT INVADDED CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE DRAWN FROM THE USSR AND THIS WAS ALREADY COVERED IN 12(I). FRG AND UK REPS FOUND BELGIAN PROPOSAL INTERESTING AND SAID THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD STUDY IT CAREFULLY.

12 BIS. MOST INTENSIVE EXCHANGE IN SEPTEMBER 12-13 POLADS MEETING WAS DISCUSSION OF THIS PARA. DISCUSSION MAY HAVE POINTED ABY TOWARDS AGREEMENT. US REP DREW ON REF B TO OPPOSE THESE MEASURES AND AGAIN ON REF C TO REPEAT THE DANGERS OF WIDENING THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF MBFR. THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES MAY TRY TO EXPAND THE AREA, BUT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR THE ALLIES TO DO SO. TURKISH REP MODERATED HIS EARLIER INSISTENCE THAT ALLIES ATTEMPT TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT WITH WP ON SUCH MEASURES AND SAID THAT PRINCIPAL MOTIVATION BEHIND TURKISH APPROACH WAS TO EQUIP ALLIES TO RESPOND IN CASE IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT THE SOVIET REDEPLOYMENTS COULD THREATEN FLANKS. ROMANIA, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD CERTAINLY RAISE ISSUE OF SOVIET REDEPLOYMENTS AND THE ALLIES MUST KNOW HOW TO RESPOND. TULUMEN EVENTUALLY AGREED TO LANGUAGE MAKING CLEAR THAT ALLIES WOULD SEEK AGREEMENT "AMONG THEMSELVES." WILLOT SUGGESTED SUBSTITUTION OF "PROVISIONS" FOR "MEASURES." HE SAID "PROVISIONS" WAS A USEFUL AMBIGUITY WHICH SOME ALLIES COULD INTERPRET AS RELATING TO FAIRLY SPECIFIC PROVISIONS IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT AND OTHERS (E.G., US) COULD INTERPRET AS APPLYING TO SOME GENERAL CAVEAT OR TACIT UNDERSTANDING WHICH COULD BE WORKED OUT OUTSIDE OF THE FRAMEWORK OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT. UK REP SAID THAT HIS MAIN INTEREST WAS TO ENSURE THAT THESE ISSUES CAN BE RAISED. HE WAS REASSURED BY US REP'S STATEMENT (PER PARA 4, REF C), THAT ALLIES WOULD MEET TO MAKE CLEAR TO SOVIETS ADVERSE EFFECT ON POLITICAL CLIMATE OF INCREASED TENSIONS ON FLANKS.

UK WAS NOT INSISTING ON SPECIFIC MEASURES -- WHICH WERE STILL UNDER STUDY IN LONDON -- BUT NEEDED TO BE ABLE TO REASSURE PUBLIC OPINION THAT SOMETHING WAS BEING DONE ON THE QUESTION OF SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS BEYOND JUST SOVIET VERBAL ASSURANCES. TURKEY AGREED WITH UK INTERPRETATION OF PROBLEM, AND NORWAY AGREED WITH BELGIAN SUGGESTION FOR SUBSTITUTING "PROVISIONS." RESULT OF DISCUSSION WAS NEW FORMULATION FOR 12 BIS (SEE TEXT SEPTTEL) WHICH ALL DELEGATIONS

AGREED TO REFER TO CAPITALS FOR APPROVAL. IF 12 BIS ACCEPTED, TURKEY WILL DROP BRACKETS AROUND TANK ARMY AND TURKEY AND UK WILL SECRET

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DROP PARA 11(III). COMMENT: TURKISH FLEXIBILITY LED WAY TO THIS NEW FORMULATION, WHICH MAY PROVIDE BASIS FOR COMPROMISE ON THIS

DIFFICULT ISSUE. TULUMEN TOLD US PRIVATELY AFTER THE MEETING, HOWEVER, THAT HE MAY HAVE GONE TOO FAR AND AT THE NEXT MEETING MIGHT HAVE TO INSERT PHRASE SUCH AS "DESIGNED TO BE USED" IN LIEU OF "DESIGNED FOR POSSIBLE USE." (AS LONG AS TURKY STICKS TO ESSENTIALS OF THIS NEW FORMULATION, WE RECOMMEND ACCEPTANCE OF THIS LANGUAGE OR SOME CLOSE APPROXIMATION TO IT WHICH ESSENTIALLY COMMITS THE ALLIES ONLY TO FURTHER STUDY. AT THIS TIME WE DOUBT THAT A BETTER SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND. END COMMENT).

PARA 12 TER. NETHERLANDS AGREED TO DROP THIS PARAGRAPH IN LIGHT AGREEMENT ON 12 BIS.

PARA 13. BRACKETED PHRASE AT END OF FIRST SENTENCE DROPPED, SINCE THE THREE WMDS ARE MENTIONED IN 12 BIS. COMMITTEE HAD LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF FINAL BRACKETED SENTENCE. FRG WAS CONCERNED THAT SOVIETS MIGHT INTERPRET A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE AS IMPLYING A DE FACTO FREEZE ON US FORCE MOVEMENTS OUTSIDE OF THE NGA. BELGIUM SHARED THIS CONCERN AND BELIEVED THAT ALLIES SHOULD SEEK TO SPECIFY THE FORCES AND AREAS TO WHICH A NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT WOULD APPLY AND TO INSURE THAT IT APPLIED ONLY TO QUANTITATIVE FORCE LEVELS. WILLOT CITED PARA 10, AC/276-D(73)2, JULY 20. MILITARY COMMITTEE REP AGREED THAT A NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT COULD UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES INHIBIT FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. US REP ARGUED AGAINST OVERBURDENING THE PROPOSAL AND AGAINST REACHING JUDGMENTS AT THIS POINT ON SPECIFICS OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH. RESULT WAS A REVISION OF FINAL BRACKETED SENTENCE TO MAKE CLEAR FRG CONCERNS OVER EFFECT ON US FORCES WHILE ALLUDING TO NEED TO AVOID "INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIED" AGREEMENT. (COMMENT: REQUEST GUIDANCE ON THIS NEW LANGUAGE. END COMMENT.)

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PARA 15. (I) AND (II). US SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS ACCEPTED. LAST SENTENCE OF BRACKETED LANGUAGE AFTER (IV) MOVED UP FROM END OF 12 (C)

AS A REMINDER THAT IT WOULD LIKELY APPLY TO MEASURES (I)-(IV).

PARA 15(E). US REP OPPOSED THIS PARAGRAPH, AGAIN ON GROUNDS THAT IT COULD EXTEND MBFR AREA. NETHERLANDS AND UK ASKED FRG TO DESCRIBE "LESS INTRUSIVE MEASURES." BOSS PROVIDED NO FURTHER RATIONALE FOR FRG SUGGESTION. (COMMENT: IF FRG DECLINES TO WITHDRAW HIS LANGUAGE, IT MIGHT FIND A PLACE IN 12 BIS., I.E. AS SOMETHING TO BE STUDIED ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS.)

PARAS 16-17. THE US PROPOSED NEW PARA 17, PER REFTTEL B. BELGIAN
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REP SAID HE COULD ACCEPT THIS NEW PARAGRAPH, AS LONG AS BOTH PARTS OF PARA 16 WERE SATISFACTORILY WORKED OUT. OTHER ALLIES REACTED VERY FAVORABLY TO US SUGGESTION. FRG REP WELCOMED US SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE AND, WHILE HE WOULD HAVE TO BRACKET US TEXT FOR TIME BEING, SAID HE WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FOR NEXT WEEK'S DISCUSSION.

RETURNING TO PARA 16, BELGIAN REP AGREED TO DROP "REDUCTIONS" IN FIRST SENTENCE. BELGIAN AND DUTCH REPS AGREED TO COMBINE THEIR TWO PROPOSALS INTO A SINGLE ALTERNATIVE. OLD PARA 17 INCORPORATED IN THIS ALTERNATIVE TEXT (SECOND BRACKETED PARAGRAPH AFTER "PLUS EITHER.") DUTCH, BELGIAN, AND FRG REPS STATED STRONGLY THAT THEY WOULD NEED SOME LANGUAGE ALONG LINES OF FIRST SENTENCE IN BELGIAN/DUTCH ALTERNATIVE, I.E., THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN SECOND STAGE WOULD "FOCUS" ON NON-US NATO FORCES. DUTCH REP (BUWALDA) SAID THAT EUROPEAN ALLIES HAD ALREADY MADE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSION IN AGREEING THAT ONLY US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN FIRST PHASE. TO ASK THEM NOW TO DROP EVEN THE PROPOSITION THAT SECOND STAGE REDUCTIONS WOULD "FOCUS" ON OTHER NATO FORCES WOULD BE ENTIRELY UNACCEPTABLE. (COMMENT: WASHINGTON WILL RECALL AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S RESPONSE TO ASYG PANSA AT JULY 27 NAC THAT WHILE US HAD MADE NO DECISION ON THE MATTER, EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD BE THE MAJOR COMPONENT OF NATO REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE (USNATO 3582). IT STRIKES US THAT TERM "FOCUS ON" IS CONSIDERABLY LESS LIMITING THAN "MAJOR COMPONENT OF," AND WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF WASHINGTON WOULD AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL SENTENCE AT END OF FIRST SECTION OF PARA 16: " ALTHOUGH THIS MATTER SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR LATER DISCUSSIONS BY THE ALLIES, IT IS ANTICIPATED

THAT THE SECOND PHASE WOULD FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS OF NATO FORCES
OTHER THAN US FORCES." FURTHER, WASHINGTON'S CONCERN THAT ALLIED
PREOCCUPATION WITH THE CONTENT SECOND STAGE MIGHT DIVERT THEM FROM
ATTENDING TO THE BUSINESS OF THE FIRST STAGE DECISIONS WOULD SEEM
TO BE NO LONGER VALID AT THIS POINT IN TIME. FINALLY, THE
UNFORTUNATE RECENT NEWS STORIES ON US THINKING ABOUT ITS SHARE
OF THE SECOND STAGE ARE LIKELY TO CAUSE THE ALLIES TO DIG IN EVEN
MORE. END COMMENT.) MCAULIFFE

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